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Abstract: Honeypots are designed to investigate malicious behaviour. Each type of homogeneous honeypot system has its own
characteristics in respect of specific security functionality, and also suffers functional drawbacks that restrict its application
scenario. In practical scenarios, therefore, security researchers always need to apply heterogeneous honeypots to cope with
different attacks. However, there is a lack of general tools or platforms that can support versatile honeynet deployment in order
to investigate the malicious behavior. In this study, the authors propose a versatile virtual honeynet management tool to address
this problem. It is a flexible tool that offers security researchers the versatility to deploy various types of honeypots. It can also
generate and manage the virtual honeynet through a dynamic configuration approach adapting to the mutable network
environment. The experimental results demonstrate that this tool is effective to perform automated honeynet deployment toward
a variety of heterogeneous honeypots.
1 Introduction
A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in
unauthorised or illicit use of that resource [1]. The honeypots are
often employed to investigate malicious behaviour. However, every
individual honeypot has its own features.
First, some honeypots such as Honeyd [2] can emulate multiple
decoys simultaneously to monitor the unauthorised traffic. These
decoys can emulate the appearance of operating systems and
vulnerable services, but they provide little interaction to the
adversaries. This kind of honeypot is called low-interaction
honeypot (LIH). Second, medium-interaction honeypot (MIH), e.g.
Amun [3] and Dionaea [‘Dionaea – catched bugs’, http://
www.dionaea.carnivore.it/], can provide much more interaction to
the adversaries and even catch the malicious payload. They can
emulate a variety of vulnerable services based on the TCP/IP
network stacks which are implemented and managed by the
underlying operating system where the MIH installs. However, it is
limited by the fact that it emulates known vulnerabilities, and its
security program only focuses on capturing the malicious traffic
accessing to its emulated vulnerable services. Third, a genuine
computer system running as a honeypot is called high-interaction
honeypot (HIH), since it can provide a fully functional operating
system to the adversaries. Using HIHs, security researchers can
capture not only the network activity, but also the system activity.
The limitation of HIHs is the resource consumption for large-scale
deployment. Therefore, every type of honeypot has its own value
for specific security goal, however, as well as has its own
functional limitation. As such, the probable approach to solve the
limitation mentioned above is to build a platform that is flexible
enough to support versatile honeynet deployment in order to trap
and investigate the attacks with appropriate decoys.
Thus, there are at least two technological considerations
regarding honeynet deployment. First, compared with deploying
physical honeynet which is not used widely since its management
limitation and resource cost, using virtualised tools is more
efficient in term of resource usage. Second, the production network
environment is mutable, thus the honeynet deployment should be
able to configure dynamically to adapt to the real time production
network environment.
However, it is a tedious task to configure and generate a virtual
honeynet manually, and even a complex task if the virtual honeynet
is required to adapt to the network environment instantly. So, it is
necessary to an automated tool to configure, deploy and manage a
flexible honeynet. Therefore, we propose a versatile virtual
honeynet enabling tool, Honeyvers, to address these problems. The
main contribution of Honeyvers is to provide a coherent
implementation that meets these three requirements:
i. It can manage the deployment of heterogeneous honeypots.
ii. It can facilitate the dynamic deployment for both LIHs and
HIHs.
iii. It can deploy honeynets for different security goals.
The organisation of this paper is as follows: in Section 2, some
related work is discussed; in Section 3, an overview of Honeyvers
architecture is presented; in Section 4, the Technology Independent
Honeynet Description Language (TIHDL) is briefly described; in
Section 5, the transformation methodology is described in detail; in
Section 6, the dynamic deployment tools are introduced; in Section
7, one kind of sensor is devised; in Section 8, honeynet deployment
is discussed; in Section 9, several experimental results are
demonstrated; and in Section 10, some conclusions are presented.
2 Related work
Dynamic honeynet can greatly improve the deployment and
maintenance of decoys by monitoring and learning the organisation
networks in real time. Though it is a challenge to achieve dynamic
honeynet configuration, there are several proposals that had
facilitated this idea [4, 5].
The most recent proposal about dynamic honeynet is a new
automated honeynet deployment for dynamic network environment
[6]. The authors advocated using honeypot as a representative
system to collect interesting traffic data for forensics analysis.
Thus, they developed a honeynet that is capable of dynamically
configuring a representative honeynet involving the combination of
both passive and active scanning. They considered the scanning
noise as the factor of the representative accuracy. The experimental
results demonstrated that the different scanning noise levels lead to
different time-consuming and representative accuracy. This
proposal focuses on the deployment strategies of dynamic
honeynet by applying the strategies to LIH, i.e. Honeyd, but did not
consider the HIH dynamic deployment.
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The proposals mentioned above focus on dynamic deployment
of LIHs. However, LIH has fidelity limitation. HIHs can guarantee
fidelity, but it is difficult to deploy them on large scale due to the
resource and management restraint. A hybrid system: namely,
Potemkin [7] was devised as a way using generic routing
encapsulation (GRE) tunnel to deploy scalable and dynamic HIHs.
It employs a network gateway, to which routers all over the
Internet are configured to tunnel an address prefix, as an agent to
take responsibility of sending traffic to a honeyfarm server. The
gateway instructs virtual machine monitor (VMM) that runs on
each physical server to create a new HIH on demand for each
active destination IP address. Otherwise, if one HIH is idle, the
VMM will destroy it and reclaim the resources when being
instructed by the gateway. However, it is not an open-source
project hence we cannot gain insight into the implementation.
Nevertheless, currently there are several tools that can be used
to deploy dynamic honeynets. Smartfrog [8] is a powerful and
flexible Java-based framework for configuring, deploying and
managing distributed software systems. It has multiple software
components across a network of computing resources. Smartfrog
proposes a simple text-based name-value language for scenario
dynamic configuration, which enables the automatically install,
start and shut down of the systems. Though the Smartfrog language
is not generic, it can facilitate dynamic honeynet deployment.
Most recently, some new virtualisation technologies were
proposed to facilitate more capable honeynet architectures. For
instance, the decoys based on kernel-based virtual machine (KVM)
hypervisor [9] can provide low-level surveillance from outside the
guest OS [10], which can keep a stealthy monitoring to the system
activity and the intruder has no way to bypass that surveillance.
Besides, Linux containers (LXC) virtualisation provides a
lightweight alternative to hypervisor-based virtualisation [11]. LXC
can create multiple isolated Linux user-space instances by
partitioning the resource of the host. Thus, the startup of an LXC-
based virtual machine is much quicker than that based on KVM,
but LXC can only emulate Linux over Linux, but not other
operating systems.
3 Overview of Honeyvers architecture
In this section, Honeyvers standing for versatile honeynet is
presented. Honeyvers consists of six components (see Fig. 1).
These components should work together to accomplish a complete
honeynet deployment. 
Through the whole Honeyvers architecture, the six major
components are the sensor, the request processor, the configuration
engine, the honeynet template repository, the specific translation
modules and the deployment tools. Besides, the request
description, TIHDL [12] and the development tool configuration
are employed separately at each step for the honeynet generation.
The request for honeynet can be made manually by security
researchers or automatically by the sensor. The sensor is not a
compulsory component of our tool, but is a supplementary client
side of Honeyvers. As soon as the tool receives the input, the
request processor first will check the request syntax. If the request
syntax is correct, then the configuration engine will process the
request content. If the request calls for a template, the
configuration engine will apply the requested template in the
repository. Otherwise, the configuration engine will make a
complete honeynet description according to the content-input.
Afterwards, the corresponding translation module will interpret the
general honeynet description into specific configuration for the
target deployment tool. At last, the deployment tools deploy the
requested honeynet by processing the corresponding specific
configuration.
The functions of the Honeyvers lead to some research and
technological challenges which are summarised by the following
questions:
i. How to support versatile honeypots with a general tool?
ii. How to facilitate the dynamic deployment?
iii. What is the honeynet deployment scale depending on different
platforms?
These three questions are answered in the following sections.
4 Technology independent honeynet description
language
TIHDL is a general language designed to describe the honeynets,
covering the specific characteristics in terms of service, operating
system and network topology. It is defined being independent of
the platform where the honeynet will be automatically deployed.
TIHDL inherits and evolves from the data model of the common
information model, which is technology independent and can
provide descriptions for almost every aspect of the computer
networks. TIHDL also follows the generic description style of
Honeyd which proposed a virtual honeynet BNF-syntax-based
description language providing general descriptions for honeynet.
Furthermore, TIHDL emulates the schema of the configuration
language of VNX [13], which provides an extensible markup
language (XML) syntax-based virtual computer network
configuration language.
5 Transformation methodology
The versatility of Honeyvers is achieved through two major
capabilities: first, it allows the honeynet scenario to be described
by TIHDL; second, it accepts various existing deployment
platforms to be plugged in. This section proposes a methodology
for transforming TIHDL into other platform configurations. The
TIHDL-based general configuration file must be transformed to a
specific configuration file which can be further recognised by
specific deployment tool. The transformation methodology is
graphically presented in Fig. 2. 
Since TIHDL uses XML-syntax, we apply the schema mapping
methodology for data integration and transformation. The
transformation methodology comprises of four steps. The task at
each step is accomplished by specific tools, our methodology,
however, is not limited to these proposed tools:
Schema mapping and transformation generator: These two tasks
can be performed simultaneously by using the comprehensive
Fig. 1  Overview of Honeyvers architecture
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XML toolkit called Stylus Studio [http://www.stylusstudio.com/].
We apply its schema mapper to the source schema and the target
schema. As we know, schema mapping is a complex task. The
schema mapping performed between two schemas with the same
level of granularity is called horizontal schema mapping. The
schema mapping otherwise from a general schema into a specific
schema is named vertical schema mapping. Currently, there are
many proposals about automated schema mapping. Considering
that the automated schema mapping works well for horizontal
mapping, but is incapable of vertical mapping, we employ Stylus
Studio which can facilitate a variety of schema mappings despite
its deficiency in providing automated mapping. After the schema
mapping, the transformation generator will create the executable
code in XSLT-stylesheet.
Interpretation processor: At this step, the input, i.e. the XML-
based source instance is interpreted according to the transformation
executable code. We employ the XSLTproc [http://
www.xmlsoft.org/XSLT/xsltproc.html] as the interpretation
processor. The output of this step is an abstract target instance
because the exact target instance needs the specific technology
dependent data; however, at this step only the general data from the
source instance are transformed and integrated.
Refining constructor: This is the last step aimed to generate the
exact target instance which can be recognised by the deployment
tool. For each specific deployment tool, we must prepare an exact
mapping in order to transform the general data into specific data.
The refining constructor is a programmable component which
currently uses Perl scripts to refine the abstract target instance by
extracting the specific data from the exact mapping hash structure.
The hash structure is as follows: (see Fig. 3).
In the hash structure, every block is named by the XPath of the
target element whose general value needs to be concretised. In each
block, the key-value pair is composed of the general value and the
specific value. The refining algorithm is as follows: (see Fig. 4). 
We apply this transformation methodology to our translation
modules. Each translation module consists of the interpretation
processor, the refining constructor, the executable code and the
exact mappings. The executable code is generated by schema
mapper, which is not a simple task. However once it is made, it can
be used permanently.
6 Dynamic deployment tools
Honeyd and VNX are employed by Honeyvers as the virtualised
tools to take the responsibility of dynamic deploying
heterogeneous honeypots.
Honeyd can emulate multiple decoys simultaneously following
a certain network topology. It has a doorway called Honeydctl to
communicate its inner workings. Honeydctl can be used to
reconfigure the templates dynamically. All commands used in the
regular configuration file of Honeyd template can be interactively
used after ‘honeydctl>’ prompt; however, this is also the weakness
of Honeydctl: the user has to input the commands interactively, one
by one. Instead of interacting with Honeydctl, Honeyd allows users
to reconfigure the Honeyd templates through a UNIX socket
located in /var/run/honeyd.sock. To apply this function, we
developed a client socket used to send scripts consisting of Honeyd
commands.
On the other hand, there are a lot of MIH software can emulate
vulnerable services, e.g. Dionaea and Amun, which need a
deployment tool to hold them. Moreover, a virtual HIH also needs
guest virtual machine as the deployment carrier to contain it. Thus,
VNX is employed since (i) its scalability in creating virtual
machines due to the ability to deploy virtual network scenarios
over a cluster of servers; (ii) its ability to individually reconfigure
any decoy dynamically without influencing other decoys; and (iii)
it integrates multiple hypervisors such as KVM and LXC and can
also supply dynamic configuration.
7 Design of sensor
Our system can accept manual input/request, but handwriting is a
tedious task. Automated request creation is required in many
scenarios. Sensor is a component which is used to generate
automated input by scanning the target production network. The
scan process is shown in Fig. 5. 
In that we focus on deploying honeypots assigned with free IP
addresses. The objective of this sensor is to generate the
corresponding honeynet description through scanning a target
production network.
The scan process starts with probing engine issuing a port/OS to
a target production network. Our tool is developed based on Nmap
[http://www.nmap.org/]; thus, we employ the Perl module: namely,
Nmap::Parser as the core of probing engine to facilitate this task.
The probing engine can probe the target production network (e.g.
nmap –sT –PR –O 192.168.1.*), and collect data including IP
address, operating system, services and open ports. Thanks to
Nmap::Parser, the data of production systems can be generated as
XML output. Afterwards, the sensor uses TIHDL to formalise the
data and generates a complete honeynet description by assigning
free IP addresses to the honeypots.
Subsequently, the sensor compares the current honeynet
description to the stored one. If the current scan is the initial one
and there is nothing stored previously, then the current description
is stored and the initial request is produced. Otherwise, the current
Fig. 2  Transformation methodology
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scan will be compared with the stored one. If the comparison result
shows that the current description is different from the stored one,
the sensor will calculate the statistics of the elements such as the
honeypots, the services and the ports, which should be added or
removed, and then produce a modification request with TIHDL,
and at the same time the sensor will update the database.
Consequently, if there is a request generated, the sensor will
send it to Honeyvers through a socket. Meanwhile, the sensor scans
the target network repeatedly at intervals.
This Nmap-based sensor is just one case of application, it has
limitation in getting a complete topology from scanning a network
which has more than one hop, but it can work well for scanning the
flat network topology for deploying honeynet integrated into the
production network with the unused IP addresses.
8 Honeynet deployment for diverse platforms
In this section, we discuss the honeynet deployment for different
deployment platforms. The honeynet deployment depends on two
conditions: the security goal of the honeypot and the performance
of the platform.
8.1 Deployment of Honeyd
Honeyd is always used to monitor the unused IP addresses in order
to capture interesting traffic as many as possible, since the network
traffic coming to the unused IP addresses seem to be suspicious
naturally. The honeypots assigned with unused IP addresses can
deceive attackers to spend time and resource attacking decoys
rather than production systems, thus they can effectively deter
attackers. Therefore, the probability of attacking on the honeypots
is increasing with the ratio of honeypots to production systems.
A Honeyd template can emulate both the operating system and
the services. Thus, every production system must use the operating
system, the service and the port information for identification.
Specifically, we assume that NPS denotes the total number of
production systems, NPSi represents the ith production system,
NFIP means the number of free IP addresses and PRIP is the
percentage of free IP addresses which should be kept for future
use. Thus, the number of virtual honeypots (NVHs) used to
emulate the ith production system isNVHPS� = NPS�NPS × NFIP × 1− �RIP ,s . t . NFIP × 1− �RIP ≥ NPS (1)
We restrict that NFIP × (1 − PRIP) ≥ NPS so that there would be
enough IP addresses to emulate production systems. When
honeypots are integrated into the production networks, the
possibility of attacks on honeypots is�VH = ∑� NVHPS�/(NPS +∑� NVHPS�) (2)
We note that NPS = ∑�NPS�, thus we can substitute the value ofNVH��� in (1) for that in (2). We can obtain�VH = NFIP(1− �RIP)/ NPS + NFIP 1− �RIP (3)
Fig. 6 plots PVH versus the ratio of free IP addresses to production
systems. 
The curve shows the relationship is exponential with the NFIP
addresses. If the NFIP addresses are the same as that of production
systems, the probability of attacking on production systems is at
least 50%. Note that this probability is mainly focusing on
automated attacks and script kiddies using automated attacking
tools, because a serious advanced attacker will do reconnaissance
and quickly detect the LIHs and also the true production systems.
8.2 Deployment of LXC-based honeypots
The honeypot used as deception to attackers fails against
automated attacks, which can attack both the honeypots and the
production systems of an organisation in a short time. Automated
malware focuses on service vulnerabilities as targets of opportunity
without regarding for OS fingerprinting. Correspondingly, MIH
can emulate multiple well-known vulnerable services in order to
catch automated malware and make some fake response on
application layer.
LXC stands for Linux containers, which shares the host kernel
to operate the virtual machines. The LXC-based virtual machine
can facilitate the deployment for those MIH software in order to
catch automated malware.
The number of vulnerable services emulated by the honeypot
installed on an LXC file system is limited. The honeypot such as
Dionaea or Amun only emulates a number of common services.
We assume that the LXC-based honeypots can catch the attacks
from other infected production systems. Thus, if a honeypot wants
to capture more malware, it has to improve the coverage of
vulnerable services of the production networks. Therefore, the
coverage of vulnerable services: namely, CGVS can be calculated
by (4) CGVS = NSERVEMUNSERVTOTAL (4)
NSERVEMU denotes the number of vulnerable service types of a
production network, which the honeypots can emulate, and
NSERVTOTAL represents the total number of vulnerable service
types of the production network.
On the other hand, the number of honeypots depends on the
load of concurrent attacks as shown by (5)
Fig. 5  Scan process. The thick lines correspond to control channel events
while the dashed lines denote flow of data
 
Fig. 6  Probability of attacking on honeypots in the network versus the
ratio of free IP addresses to the NPSs
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NVH × PFVH ≥ LDCA (5)
NVH means the number of virtual honeypots, PFVH denotes the
performance of sustaining concurrent attacks by an LXC-based
virtual honeypot, and LDCA is the total count of concurrent attack
load. We note that the value of PFVH will decrease if NVH
increases, but the relationship between them is not a simple inverse
ratio. We present their inverse relationship in Section 9.
8.3 Deployment of KVM-based honeypots
Not all of the threats come from automated attacks. The human-
generated attacks always focus exclusively on several specific
victims. Before attacking the victim, an adversary must make a
reconnaissance. However, making a large-scale fingerprint scan is
a tedious work and it is currently infeasible to scan an IPv6
network. Actually, except for scanning the target system, there are
several other methods for reconnaissance. For example, the
adversary can get the victim's information through DNS server.
In the case of human-generated attack, the target victim is
elaborately selected by the attacker. The attacker may alter the
system logs or even launch new attacks to other production
systems through this compromised one. Thus, it is necessary to
monitor the system activities generated by attackers. The HIHs are
able to accomplish this task. However, it is not necessary to deploy
so many HIHs assigned with unused IP addresses, because the
heavily occupied IP addresses of a network will also cause the
attacker's suspicion.
Importantly, we should guarantee the fidelity of the HIH. There
are two ways to improve the fidelity. First, it is necessary to be able
to emulate as many different types of operating systems as
possible. KVM hypervisor can emulate any guest OS under x86
architecture. Thus, KVM can guarantee the versatile emulation.
Second, as HIHs are used to capture the system activities, we
should guarantee the performance of each KVM-based virtual
honeypot. However, the number of KVM-based honeypots is
inversely correlated with the performance of each honeypot. This
relationship is demonstrated in Section 9.
9 Case study
9.1 Testbed
The system parameters of the host node are: central processing unit
(CPU), 4 Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3470 CPU at 3.20 GHz; random
access memory (RAM), 16 GB; OS, Ubuntu 14.04 LTS; Kernel,
Linux 3.13.0-24-generic. This Honeyvers server is integrated into a
production network. The network includes computers belonging to
faculty, staff and students. After an initial scan on the network, the
information about the IP addresses and operating systems is
produced: 16% of IP addresses are occupied by production systems
and 84% of them are unused. It indicates that numerous virtual
honeypots can be mined into the production network. In that the
ratio of unused IP addresses to production systems is close to 5,
which means the probability of attacking on honeypots is close to
80% according to Fig. 6.
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of operating systems
available in the production network. Accordingly, the decoys
emulated by Honeyd could be assigned with these operating
systems in proportion to what is shown in this table. Besides, at
least two types of KVM-based file system (Windows and Linux)
should be prepared to set up HIHs. 
Table 2 summarises the open ports that appear more than two
times among the production systems. The most popular ports are
bound up with services http and ssh. If the LXC-based honeypot
can emulate all of these open ports, the decoy will get a high
probability of catching malware. 
9.2 Nmap load test
In that Nmap is an active fingerprint tool, it will generate traffic
load into the production network. Nmap offers six levels of timing
templates which influence the timing and performance. We test the
Nmap load using the two most common modes: normal and polite.
The TCP SYN scan is used to perform the port scan. The command
is such as this: Nmap –sS –P0 –O 138.4.7.128/25. The load tests
using normal mode are demonstrated in Fig. 7. 
The left part of Fig. 7 shows a natural normal SYN scan, which
allows the Nmap itself to adjust the scan timing and performance.
This approach generates a network load of ∼5 kB/s which lasts
about 200 s. However, the complete scan takes 385.25 s.
Subsequently, we tested the normal SYN scan with 20 parallel
scans. The result is shown on the right part of Fig. 7. The scan
period is 245.19 s, which is shorter than the previous one.
However, this approach generates much more network load, which
even roughly remains at 10 kB/s at the beginning of the scan. After
25 s, the load reaches around 5 kB/s, and at the interval between 90
and 210 s, the load still keeps at more than 6 kB/s.
Table 1 Operating system distribution
Linux
3.7–
3.9
Linux
2.6.13–
2.6.38
Windows
Server
2008
Beta 3
Windows
Vista or
Win7
VxWorks
6.5
Android
4.1.1
Other
unknown
OS
5% 23% 5% 5% 9% 10% 53%
 
Table 2 Most popular open ports of the entire production
network
Port number 22 80 111 443 445 631 902 5666 7200 8080
counting 14 17 5 5 2 2 3 2 5 2
 
Fig. 7  Port scans of normal mode
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Different from the normal mode, the polite mode serialises the
individual port scans for each IP with a delay of 400 ms between
scans. The objective of this approach is to decrease the overhead
imposed on the network. However, it costs a long time to finish a
complete scan. The left part of Fig. 8 shows the scan result via the
polite mode with 20 parallel scans. 
So, the left part shows that the highest load is about 3 kB/s.
After about 500 s, the load decrease to <0.4 kB/s. The complete
scan takes 2277.04 s. To shorten the scan period, we increased the
number of parallel scans to 40, and the result is shown on the right
part of Fig. 8. Then, the complete scan only takes 1344.91 s, which
is less than that of using 20 parallel scans.
Therefore, these two modes have their own advantages and
disadvantages. We recommend that if the production network is a
server network, which is relatively stable, but has heavy network
load, it would be better to use polite mode to scan the server
network. However, if the production network includes lots of client
systems, which can evoke mutable network environment, then we
could apply the normal mode to scan the production network as
soon as possible.
9.3 LXC performance test
VNX can deploy LXC-based honeypots which can only emulate
the Linux operation system. Thus, this method lacks fidelity.
However, the LXC-based virtual machine is very suitable for the
MIHs such as Dionaea and Amun.
Security is tightly coupled with performance, thus we use the
Phoronix Test Suite (PTS) [http://www.phoronix-test-suite.com/] to
test the performance of virtual honeypots. PTS is an open-source
benchmark platform which has been used to benchmark and
compare various system attributes.
Table 2 shows that the most common port 80 binds to http
service. Thus, we use Apache benchmark of PTS to test the LXC-
based honeypots. Apache benchmark measures how many requests
a given system can sustain per second when carrying out 500,000
requests with 100 being carried out concurrently. This benchmark
is chosen as it provides insight on how the LXC-based honeypot is
able to handle increasing input/output stress in terms of CPU and
memory usage when the NVHs increases.
Table 3 shows how the increasing number of virtual machines
affects the performance. Our Honeyvers server itself can sustain
20,656.09 requests per second. In Table 3, the performance
declines as the number of concurrent honeypots increases.
However, even though the host runs 20 virtual honeypots, it still
has a good performance in terms of request sustain. 
We also tested the host performance of deploying virtual
honeypots. We used the Linux system command ‘top’ to monitor
the system performance when deploying ten LXC-based
honeypots. The test results are shown in Table 4. 
The results show that the startup of LCX-based virtual
honeypots is very fast, <1 s for ten VMs to boot up, and the
resource occupation is also quite low. So, if fidelity is not the most
important concern, the LXC-based MIH is a better choice.
9.4 KVM performance test
VNX can also deploy KVM-based HIH which can emulate various
operating systems. The problem of this method is also the
performance. We should guarantee the performance of each KVM-
based honeypot to improve the fidelity. However, the number of
KVM-based virtual machines that can be sustained by the host is
limited due to the host resource. Thus, we test both the
performance of the host and the virtual machine.
The parameters of the virtual machines are: CPU, 1 Intel(R)
Core(TM)2 Duo CPU T7700 at 2.40 GHz; RAM, 384 MB; OS,
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS; Kernel, Linux 3.13.0-24-generic.
First, we observed the system performance when launching
only one honeypot on the host machine. It costs 40.02 s to startup
one honeypot. The memory used by the process during this
experiment is demonstrated in Fig. 9. 
The virtual memory usage is not stable. After the honeypot is
switched on, the usage of virtual memory decreases to 726 MB.
However, the physical memory usage is quite steady after 16.87 s.
It maintains at the level of around 160 MB, and in the end it stays
at 206 MB.
Fig. 8  Port scans of polite mode
 
Table 3 Apache benchmark results based on LXC
Number of honeypots 5 10 15 20
Requests per second 19,309.32 18,395.51 18,008.72 17,832.99
 
Table 4 Host performance with ten LXC-based honeypots
TIME+ RES VIRT %CPU %MEM
0:00.68 37M 168M 22.5 0.2
 
Fig. 9  Virtual and physical memory used by the process
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Second, we deployed 10 KVM-based honeypots. The host
launched ten processes, and each process is corresponded to one
honeypot. The largest values of the five parameters of command
‘top’ are resulted from these ten processes in Table 5. 
The largest parameter values of these ten processes are more or
less the same as those we got when launching one. Though VNX
sequentially launches the KVM-based machines, the total startup
time for ten HIHs is not a simple accumulation of the total time of
each active process. The total startup time for ten KVM-based
honeypots is around 5 min.
On the other hand, we consider the performance of the KVM-
based HIHs, because many adversaries can detect the honeypots by
testing the system performance. In that it is probable for the
adversary to read and write the system resource, we use the Stream
benchmark of PTS to test performance of the KVM-based
honeypots. The Stream benchmark of PTS is built from a
programme which is designed to measure the sustainable memory
bandwidth rather than the burst or peak performance of a machine.
The Stream benchmark has four operating modes: copy, scale, triad
and add. Fig. 10 shows how the increasing number of honeypots
affects the performance of the four operating modes. 
With the NVHs increasing, only the copy mode still performs in
an acceptable range, the other three modes however show very
poor performance. The reason is that the other three modes rely
more heavily on the CPU to do some computations on the data
being before writing them to memory. This is contrary to the copy
mode which measures transfer rates without doing any additional
arithmetic.
9.5 Evaluation of the complete framework
We deployed virtual honeypots in a low security production
network of Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM). Owing to
the IP address resource limitation, we only applied two unused IP
addresses registered in DNS for deploying virtual honeypots.
Owing to the current security requirements of the campus network
of UPM, we cannot deploy HIHs in the production network, and
the LIHs, however, can only provide a little interaction to the
attackers. Thus, we choose to deploy two virtual MIHs: Dionaea
and Amun. After the data capture for 10 days, from December 17
to December 26, we calculated the statistic of data capture by the
two MIHs in Table 6. 
The statistic shows that the Dionaea suffered 6758 incidents and
21 of them hit the emulated vulnerabilities, whereas the Amun
suffered 278 incidents and 15 of them hit the emulated
vulnerabilities. The most popular vulnerable service is FTP using
port 21. Thus, the production system should focus on protecting the
FTP service from being attacked. Amun even captured one
complete attack on port 21 and recorded the attacker's payloads:
2015-12-26 04:38:08,031 INFO [vuln_ftpd] Attacker:
62.210.207.107 Message: ['USER anonymous\r\n'] Bytes: 16
Stage: FTPD_STAGE1
2015-12-26 04:38:08,066 INFO [vuln_ftpd] Attacker:
62.210.207.107 Message: ['PASS anonymous@\r\n'] Bytes: 17
Stage: FTPD_STAGE1
2015-12-26 04:38:08,101 INFO [vuln_ftpd] Attacker:
62.210.207.107 Message: ['CWD /\r\n'] Bytes: 7 Stage:
FTPD_STAGE2
2015-12-26 04:38:08,135 INFO [vuln_ftpd] Attacker:
62.210.207.107 Message: ['TYPE A\r\n'] Bytes: 8 Stage:
FTPD_STAGE2.
We lookup this IP address and find the attacker is from Ile-de-
France, Paris, France. Besides, we also lookup the busiest attacker
using IP address 61.216.2.14, which were captured by both of the
two honeypots, and it is from Taipei, Taiwan. Another busy
attacker using IP address 83.34.220.39 locates in Pais Vasco,
Gernika-Lumo, Spain. In addition, the Amun captured 30 unknown
shellcodes which can be used for further investigation and improve
the vulnerability emulation.
10 Conclusion and future work
A honeypot is deliberately used to be probed, attacked and
compromised, in order to protect production systems, as well as
investigate the well known and, especially, the unknown attacks.
Owing to the requirement of applying heterogeneous honeypots to
various attacks, in this paper, we propose a versatile virtual
honeynet management tool called Honeyvers that can configure
heterogeneous honeypots based on the generic language called
TIHDL. Thanks to the combination of VNX and Honeyd,
Honeyvers can emulate various individual honeypots. We also
propose different honeynet deployment strategies for all the LIHs,
MIHs and HIHs in terms of their design and application features.
The experimental results show that the Honeyvers can be used to
quickly and flexibly deploy different virtual honeynets. We apply
the Honeyvers to deploy virtual honeypots in real production
network as well, which validates the framework performs well in
capturing real attacks. Admittedly, the performance of data capture
mainly depends on the selected underlying honeypot software,
while Honeyvers focus on the upper management. Thus, in the
future, we will consider integrating much more individual
honeypots into the framework in order to improve the power of
data capture. Furthermore, we plan to design a flexible and
adaptive honeynet system based on this tool for deploying specific
honeypots against specific attacks. A more powerful sensor that
can obtain the information of a complex network topology is under
consideration as well.
11 Acknowledgments
This research is supported in part by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (nos. 61440057, 61272087, 61363019 and
61073008), the Beijing Natural Science Foundation (nos. 4082016
and 4122039), the Sci-Tech Interdisciplinary Innovation and
Cooperation Team Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences,
the Specialized Research Fund for State Key Laboratories. It is also
partially funded with support from the Spanish MICINN (project
RECLAMO, Virtual and Collaborative Honeynets based on Trust
Management and Autonomous Systems applied to Intrusion
Management, with codes TIN2011-28287- C02-01 and
TIN2011-28287-C02-02) and the European Commission (FEDER/
ERDF).
Table 5 Host performance with ten KVM-based honeypots
TIME+ RES VIRT %CPU %MEM
1:08 206M 864M 118 1.3
 
Fig. 10  Stream benchmark results based on KVM
 
Table 6 Statistic of data capture
Incidents/
hits
Successfully
attacked port
(counts)
The two busiest
attackers (counts)
Dionaea 6758/21 21(14), 5060(5),
42(1), 32,847(1)
83.34.220.39 (4),
61.216.2.14 (3)
Amun 278/15 21(15) 61.216.2.14 (4),
62.210.207.107 (4)
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